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Recent Developments
Casey v. Planned Parenthood:
Petitioners brought suit in the United
SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT States District Court for the Eastern
ST ATES MAY ENACT MEA- District of Pennsylvania seeking deSURES WHICH PERSUADE claratory and injunctive relief. The
WOMEN TO CHOOSE CHILD- district court ruled all ofthe provisions
BIRTH OVER ABORTION.
unconstitutional and issued a permaIn Casey v. Planned Parenthood, nent injunction prohibiting their en112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), the Supreme forcement. The Court of Appeals for
Court rejected the trimester framework the Third Circuit upheld all of the
established by Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. regulations except for the spousal noti113 (1973), and held that the constitu- fication requirement. The United States
tionality ofabortion regulations before Supreme Court granted certiorari to
fetal viability must be judged by an clarify the central holding in Roe.
''undue burden" standard. In so holdThe Court used a three part analysis
ing, the Court affirmed the essential in its examination ofthe holding inRoe
holding of Roe, which recognized a v. Wade. Casey. 112 S. Ct. at 2804.
woman's right to terminate her preg- The Court noted that the central holdnancy before viability without undue ing of Roe, recognized the following:
interference from the state. However, (1) the woman's right to choose to have
it significantly deviated from Roe by an abortion before viability without
holding that a state is permitted to state interference, (2) the state's power
enact measures designed to persuade to restrict abortion after viability with
women to choose childbirth over abor- exceptions for danger to the life or
tion so long as those measures do not health ofthe mother, and (3) the state's
constitute an undue burden on the ex- legitimate interest from the outset of
pregnancy in protecting both the life of
ercise of that right.
Five provisions of the Pennsylva- the mother and health ofthe fetus.
nia Abortion Control Act of 1982 as
In its analysis, the Court first reafamended in 1988 and 1989 (the "Act") firmed that a woman's constitutional
were challenged by Petitioners, five interest in the right to an abortion beabortion clinics and one physician on fore fetal viability was a fundamental
behalf of a class of physicians per- liberty interest protected by the Due
forming abortions ("Petitioners"). The Process Clause of the Fourteenth
provisions of the Act required that: (1) Amendment. Id. Citing prior settled
a woman seeking an abortion give her decisions, the Court next affirmed the
informed consent prior to the abortion fundamental principle that the Constiprocedure, (2) a woman be provided tution limits the state's power to interwith certain information prior to the fere with parenthood and family deciprocedure, (3) minors obtain parental sions. Id. at 2806. The Court also
consent, (4) married women notify their acknowledged the strong moral and
husbands prior to the abortion proce- political feelings that the abortion dedure, and (5) facilities performing abor- cision engendered. Id. at 2806. Detion procedures comply with certain clining to become entangled in those
reporting requirements. In anticipa- "feelings," the Court strove to detertion of the provisions taking effect, the mine only ''whether the state can re-

solve these . . . questions in such a
defmitive way that a woman lacks all
choice in the matter." Id.
The Court noted that the constitution protects the right of a person to be
"free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child" Id. at
2807 (quotingEisenstadtv. Baird,405
U.S. 438, 453 (1972». The Court
recognized that abortion is a unique
act, but acknowledged that a state may
not proscribe it in all instances because
the liberty of a woman "is at stake in a
sense unique to the human condition
and so unique to the law." Id The
Court concluded that any reservations
it may have had about affirming Roe
were outweighed by the concept of
personal liberty under the Due Process
Clause and the principles of stare
decisis. Id.
To further justify its refusal to overrule Roe, the Court reviewed the principles of institutional integrity and
concluded that the cost of overruling
Roe in the face of pressure to do so by
certain societal interests would cause
profound damage to the Court's .integrity as an institution dedicated to the
rule oflaw. Id. at 2814-15. Thus, the
Court recognized that the fundamental
decision ofRoe was based on a constitutional analysis which it could not
now repUdiate. Id at 2817.
The Court next turned to the important question of defming the limits ofa
woman's protected liberty interest.ld
The Court reasoned that it was required to draw a line where the state
may not interfere with a woman's right
to control her own body in order to give
meaning to the protected liberty. Id
The Court reaffirmed that viability was
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where it drew this line. Id. Most importantly, the Court noted that, because viability was the point at which
a fetus could survive outside the womb,
viability also marked the time when a
fetus became deserving ofstate protection.Id. at 2818. While recognizing
that a woman's right to terminate her
pregnancy before viability was the central holding of Roe, the Court pointed
out that Roe also recognized the importance ofthe state's interest in "potentiallife." Id.
The Court then examined the trimester framework established by Roe
in light ofthe state's interest in "potentiallife." Id. at 2819. The Court found
that the trimester framework had the
effect of contradicting some of the
state's permissible powers in the early
stages of a woman's pregnancy. Id.
Because the Court believed the trimester framework undervalued the state's
interest in "potential life," the Court
rejected the trimester framework
adopted in Roe. Id.
The Court next addressed whether
limitations on a woman's rightto abort
pre-viability fetuses were permissible.
Id. at 2819. The Court held that ifthe
law was not designed to strike at the
abortion right itself and had the incidental effect of making the right more
difficult to exercise, then such a law
would not be invalidated. Id. Only
where a law imposed an undue burden
on the exercise of the right would the
state be held to have interfered with the
liberty interest ofthe woman protected
by the Due Process Clause. Id. Under
the Court's analysis, laws which "do
no more than create a structural mechanism by which the state . . . may
express a profound respect for the life
ofthe unborn are permitted, if they are
not a substantial obstacle to the
woman's exercise of the right to
choose." Id. at 2821.
The Court then applied the "undue
burden" standard to the provisions of
the Act. Id. at 2822. The Court first
addressed the Act's definition of"medical emergency" and found that it was
central to the operation of the other
provisions of the Act. Id. The Court
concluded that limiting abortions in
certain situations to medical emergencies, as defined under the Act and as
construed by the court of appeals imposed no "undue burden" on a

woman's right to an abortion. Id. at
2822.
The Court next addressed the informed consent requirement ofthe Act.
Id. The Court concluded that requiring
specific information be given to the
woman regarding the gestational age
of the unborn child, the availability of
alternatives to abortion and including a
mandatory 24 hour waiting period, did
not constitute an ''undue burden." Id.
at 2823-24. The Court reasoned that
even ifthe information given expressed
a preference for childbirth over abortion, the giving of truthful, non-misleading information ensured that a
woman understood the full impact of
her decision. Id. at 2823. In so holding, the Court overruled certain portions of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S.
416 (1983) ("Akron f'), and Thornbird
v. American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists, 476 U.S.747
(1986). Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2823.
Turning to the 24 hour waiting period, the Court overruled its decision in
Akron I which held that a 24 hour
waiting period served no legitimate
state concern. Id. at 2824. The Court
held that an informed decision would
be promoted by some period of reflection, particularly where information
concerning the abortion decision was
given to the woman. Id. The Court
acknowledged that the waiting period
was a substantial obstacle for women
who lacked financial resources or were
burdened by other considerations such .
as explaining their whereabouts to
employers or family. Id. at 2825.
Nevertheless, the court concluded that
the effect of "increasing the cost and
risk of delay of abortions" did not
constitute an ''undue burden." Id.
Addressing the husband notification requirement of the Act, the Court
concluded that based on expert testimony and evidence presented to the
lower court regarding domestic violence, the husband notification requirement was likely to prevent a significant
numberofwomenfromobtainingabortions. Id. at 2829. The Court concluded that the father's interest in the
potential life did not justify permitting
a state to empower him with veto power
over his wife's decision. Id. at 2833.
The Court treated the parental notification requirements of the Act sum-

marily, holding that a state may require
consent of the parent or guardian prior
to a minor obtaining an abortion so
long as there is an adequate judicial
bypass. Id. at 2832. Finally, the Court
found the record keeping requirements
of the Act permissible. Id. The Court
held that the requirements were reasonably related to the ''preservation of
maternal health and. . . that they
properly respected a patient's confidentiality and privacy." Id. (quoting
Planned Parenthood ofCentral Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 80 (1976».
Thus, the Court upheld all of the
provisions of the Act with the exception of the husband notification requirement enunciating an ''undue burden" standard by which to assess the
constitutionality oflaws which restrict
a woman's right to choose abortion
prior to fetal viability. The opinion
was joined by concurring and dissenting opinions from all sides. While
accepting its responsibility to "defme
the freedom guaranteed by the
Constitution's ... promise of liberty,"
the Court has charted a course which
will continue to engender confusion
among courts and legislatures and endanger the liberty of women to control
their reproductive lives. Thus, it is
clear that the Court's decision in Casey
has not secured for women the constitutional protection oftheir liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
.
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CipoUone v. Liggett Group, Inc.:

FEDERAL CIGARETTE LABELING LAWS DO NOT PREEMPT
CERTAIN STATE AND COMMON
LAW ACTIONS.
In a controversial case of flI'St impression, the United States Supreme
Court held in Cipollonev. Liggett Group,
Inc., 112 s. Ct. 2608 (1992) that the
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of
1969 ("1969 Act") did not preclude a
smoker who developed lungcancerfrom
suing cigarette manufacturers undercertain state and common law theories.
The smoker's claims for breach of express warranty, intentional ftaud and
misrepresentation, and conspiracy were
upheld despite the 1969 Act's warning
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